


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DIRECTORATE OF  
INTELLIGENCE

# Intelligence Memorandum

*Algerian Involvement in the Middle East Crisis*

**Secret**

14 June 1967  
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Directorate of Intelligence  
14 June 1967

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Algerian Involvement in the Middle East Crisis

1. The degree of Algerian involvement in the Middle East crisis--the rapid sending of troops and aircraft to Egypt, the break in relations with the US, and the "never say die" attitude on continuing the battle--appears to be largely an emotional response of a normally practical people. There are several factors, however, which almost demanded of Algeria the response its government has made.

2. First of all, Algeria regards itself as a Moslem-Arab state, socialist oriented and anti-Western; it has developed strong military and economic ties with the Soviet Union. It has aligned itself with the "progressive" Arab states--Egypt, Syria, and to a lesser extent Iraq--and considers itself a leader in the "third world." It has a revolutionary outlook similar to Nasir's, is hyper-suspicious of the West, and, in its own eyes, is ready to come to the aid of those endangered by the Western imperialists. Moreover, many Algerian leaders are convinced that the "imperialists" are out to get the Algerian regime, and their suspicions are fed by US support of Morocco and Tunisia, and by fears of a US-instigated encirclement.

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3. Popular sentiment for the Arabs and pressures within the Boumediene regime itself were very strong. Even before the hostilities, there was evidence that Boumediene, frustrated perhaps with economic problems at home, was turning to a more adventurous external policy similar to that of Ben Bella's [REDACTED] a more activist role in the liberation of southern Africa [REDACTED]

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4. Algeria, unlike the other two North African states, had nothing to lose by offending the US. Both Morocco and Tunisia are closely aligned with the US and want to keep those ties. US-Algerian relations, however, have been at a low ebb for some time, and, shortly before hostilities, long drawn-out negotiations over Algerian requests for US wheat--about the only American aid to Algeria--failed, possibly giving Boumediene a further sense of kinship with Nasir.

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5. Long-held suspicions of the West also probably are playing a role in the propaganda battle. The atmosphere in Algeria was and is ready-made to accept Cairo radio's stories. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Boumediene's speech on 11 June is replete with charges against the "imperialists" and suggestions that Israel could not have done as well without aid from the US and UK.

6. The Algerians also probably wanted to show that they could fight. They consider themselves rough and tough and were reportedly extremely angered at Cairo's decision not to fight on. They were stunned that Egypt gave up in four days, when they--in order to win their independence--fought the superior French for seven years. The Algerians may even have some ambitions to play a more leading role

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in the Middle East in the wake of the Egyptian debacle.

7. There is no evidence that the Soviets egged on Algeria, and the Soviet push for a cease-fire would tend to discount any speculation that they did. The Algerians, however, because of their heavy dependence on the Soviets for arms and economic assistance, obviously are vulnerable to any pressures the Soviets choose to exert.

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